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[1]
Litigation is a method of resolving disputes that is too costly and
time consuming for most parties involved. As a Federal Magistrate Judge
involved in case management on a day-to-day basis, I often see evidence
of this. I also participated in the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation held
at Duke Law School 1 and sponsored by the Federal Judicial Conference
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. 2 The conference
explored “the current costs of civil litigation in Federal Court, particularly
discovery, and discuss[ed] possible solutions.” 3 As part of the conference,
the Federal Judicial Center presented its research findings on its study of
the costs of litigation in federal court. 4 Further, all of the papers submitted
* David J. Waxse is a United States Magistrate Judge in the District of Kansas. The
author thanks Ken Withers, Director of Judicial Education for The Sedona Conference®,
for his insight and support, as well as my wife, Judy Pfannenstiel, and my law clerk
Brenda Yoakum-Kriz, for their assistance with editing and revising this article. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and not the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas.
1

See Conference Panelists, 2010 CIVIL LITIG. CONF., 4 (May 10-11, 2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Pa
nelists.pdf.
2

2010 CIVIL LITIG. CONF., http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulem
aking/Overview/DukeWebsite Msg.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
3

Id.

4

See JUDICIAL CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON
THE 2010 CONF. ON CIVIL LITIG. (May 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/us
courts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Report%20to
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to the conference are available on the U.S. Courts’ website for the
conference. 5
[2]
Many articles and reports have been written about the conference,
but in my view there was a clear consensus among the participants that
civil litigation takes too long and costs too much. The ultimate purpose of
the conference was to try to find ways to effectuate the purposes of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—“to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” 6 As the
Report to the Chief Justice of the United States on the conference
indicates, participants provided many specific and general suggestions for
changes in both rules and litigation practices. 7
[3]
Although there were suggestions for changes in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the participants were unable to reach any clear
consensus on any specific changes. 8 Among the other areas the
participants discussed were increased judicial involvement in case
management and the use of sanctions for improper behavior. 9 The
suggestion I made, along with many other participants, was to encourage
cooperation in the discovery process, a suggestion that became a
consensus recommendation. 10
%20the%20Chief%20Justice.pdf (reporting on the overall purpose of the conference as
well as the schedule).
5

See 2010 CIVIL LITIG. CONF., supra note 2 (click on “Papers Submitted by Conference
Panelists”).
6

Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).

7

See generally JUDICIAL CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 4.
8

CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES

See id. at 12 (highlighting “two particular areas that merit the Rules Committees'
prompt attention,” rather than recommending specific changes).

9

See id. at 8-10.

10

See id. at 10.
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[4]
What is cooperation and why will it work as a solution to the
problems of increased costs and delay in litigation? According to the
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, cooperation is “the action of cooperating”
and cooperating is “to act or work with another . . . for mutual benefit.” 11
[5]
Before I talk about cooperation in the litigation context, I want to
explore what scientific research has shown on why humans cooperate.
Although lawyers and judges do not need to fully understand the science
on why humans cooperate, I think it is helpful to understand that there are
scientific grounds for why cooperation occurs. For example, Russell
Hardin, in a portion of the abstract to his article “The Genetics of
Cooperation,” says:
Much of the literature . . . supposes that we must explain
directly the cooperative tendency, whether by individual or
group selection. A more effective way to go is to find
something more general and likely more deeply embedded
in personal traits that enables and even enhances
cooperation. [Several scholars], long ago proposed a
psychological phenomenon now called mirroring, which
induces good relations through shared sentiments in a way
that is essentially hard-wired.
Mirroring indirectly
contributes to cooperativeness. There may be other
similarly indirect ways to account for human
cooperativeness. 12
James H. Fowler, Laura A. Baker, and Christopher T. Dawes, in their
paper titled “The Genetic Basics of Political Cooperation,” say in the
abstract: “Cooperation has been a focus of intense interest in the biological
11

Cooperation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/c
ooperation (last visited Feb. 13, 2012); Cooperating, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cooperate (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
12

Russell Hardin, The Genetics of Cooperation, 28 ANALYSE & KRITIK 57, 57 (2006),
available at www.analyse-und-kritik.net/2006-1/AK_Hardin_2006.pdf.

3
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and social sciences. . . . These results suggest that humans exhibit genetic
variation in their tendency to cooperate and that biological evolution has
played an important role in the development of political cooperation.” 13
More recently in an October 2011 blog post in the “Anthropology in
Practice,” section of Scientific American, Krystal D’Costa stated:
Cooperation confounds us: Humans are the only members
of the animal kingdom to display this tendency to the extent
that we do, and it’s an expensive endeavor with no
guarantee of reciprocal rewards. While we continue to look
for answers about how and why cooperation may have
emerged in human social and cultural evolution, we are
beginning to trace the developmental roots of prosocial
behaviors. 14
[6]
There are also numerous references to cooperation in the
interdisciplinary fields of systems analysis, 15 social science research, 16 and
13

James H. Fowler, Laura A. Baker & Christopher T. Dawes, The Genetic Basics of
Political Cooperation, DIGITAL COMMONS@U. NEB. - LINCOLN, 1 (Oct. 9, 2006),
available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=
politicalsciencehendricks.
14

Krystal D’Costa, Cooperation Is Child’s Play, SCI. AM. (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/anthropology-inpractice/2011/10/10/cooperationnisc
hilds-play. But see Eric Michael Johnson, On the Origin of Cooperative Species: New
Study Reverses a Decade of Research Claiming Chimpanzee Selfishness, THE PRIMATE
DIARIES (Aug. 8, 2011), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/primate-diaries/2011/08/08
/origin-of-cooperative-species/ (“But a new study reveals for the first time that thinking
of others unites humans and chimpanzees in a cooperative bond that reaches across two
epochs to the very evolutionary ancestor Darwin predicted.”).
15

See, e.g., Otto Pulkkinen, Emergence of Cooperation and Systems Intelligence, in
SYSTEMS INTELLIGENCE AND LEADERSHIP IN EVERYDAY LIFE 251 (Raimo P. Hämäläinen
& Esa Saarinen eds. 2007), available at http://www.sal.tkk.fi/publications/pdffiles/rpul07.pdf.
16

See, e.g., Ming Ming Chiu, Group Problem-Solving Processes: Social Interactions and
Individual Actions, 30 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 27, 36, available at http://gse.buffalo.edu
/fas/chiu/pdf/Group_Problem_Solving_Processes.pdf.
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brain research. 17 In many of these fields researchers are using brain scans
to track what causes humans to cooperate. 18 Other clear messages from
the research are that cooperation can be taught and that cultural
mechanisms help develop cooperation. 19
[7]
That understanding helped in the development of The Sedona
Conference® 20 “Cooperation Proclamation” 21 in 2009. As of September
2010, I, along with over 100 other judges, have endorsed the Cooperation
The Cooperation Proclamation begins with this
Proclamation. 22
observation:
The costs associated with adversarial conduct in pre-trial
discovery have become a serious burden to the American
judicial system.
This burden rises significantly in
discovery of electronically stored information (“ESI”). In
addition to rising monetary costs, courts have seen
escalating motion practice, overreaching, obstruction, and
extensive, but unproductive discovery disputes—in some
17

See, e.g., Christie Nicholson, Brains Built to Cooperate, SCI. AM. (Nov. 6, 2011),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode.cfm?id=brains-built-to-cooperate-1111-06.
18

See, e.g., James K. Rilling et al., A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation, 35 NEURON
395 (2002), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S08966
27302007559.

19

See id. at 403.

20

Frequently Asked Questions, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE®, http://www.thesedonacon
ference.org/ content/faq (last visited Feb. 6, 2012) (introducing The Sedona Conference®
as a nonprofit, 501(c)(3) research and educational institute dedicated to the advanced
study of law and policy in the areas of antitrust law, complex litigation, and intellectual
property rights).

21

See The Sedona Conference®, The Sedona Conference® Cooperation Proclamation,
10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331 (2009).
22

Id. at 336.

5
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cases precluding adjudication on the merits altogether—
when parties treat the discovery process in an adversarial
manner [sic]. Neither law nor logic compels these
outcomes. 23
[8]
The Cooperation Proclamation acknowledges that what is required
is a “paradigm shift for the discovery process.” 24
The Sedona
Conference®, in the Proclamation, envisions a three-part process:
(1) Awareness (the Proclamation itself);
(2) Commitment (the writing of a Brandeis style brief “The Case
for Cooperation” to develop a “detailed understanding and full
articulation of the issues and changes needed to obtain
cooperative fact-finding”); and
(3) Tools (“[d]eveloping and distributing practical ’toolkits’ to
train and support lawyers, judges, other professionals, and
students in techniques of discovery cooperation, collaboration,
and transparency.”). 25
As part of the effort to provide tools to promote cooperation, The Sedona
Conference® created “Resources for the Judiciary” 26 and “The Sedona
Conference® Cooperation Guidance for Litigators & In-House
Counsel.” 27
23

Id. at 331.

24

Id. at 332.

25

Id. at 332-33.

26

THE SEDONA CONFERENCE®, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE® COOPERATION
PROCLAMATION: RESOURCES FOR THE JUDICIARY 2 (2011), available at http://www
.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=Judicial_Resources.pdf.
27

THE SEDONA CONFERENCE®, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE® COOPERATION GUIDANCE
LITIGATORS & IN-HOUSE COUNSEL 1 (2011), available at http://www.thesedon

FOR

6
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[9]
The Sedona Conference® Cooperation Guidance for Litigators &
In-House Counsel discusses an issue often raised by lawyers when
presented with the idea of cooperation: How does the idea of cooperation
exist in an adversary system where each lawyer has a duty of zealous
advocacy? 28 Lawyers and judges should consider that the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct removed the former ethical obligation for
zealous advocacy from the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility when the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
replaced the Code in 1983. 29
[10] Prior to that, Canon 7 of the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility stated: “A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously
Within the Bounds of the Law.” 30 Even in 1983, under Canon 7, Ethical
Consideration [EC 7-39] discussed cooperation. 31 It stated:
In the final analysis, proper functioning of the adversary
system depends upon cooperation between lawyers and
tribunals in utilizing procedures which will preserve the
impartiality of tribunals and make their decisional
processes prompt and just, without impinging upon the

aconference.org/dltForm?did=Cooperation_Guidance_for_Litigators_and_In_House_Co
unsel.pdf.
28

See id. at 2, 17.

29

See Elizabeth Mary Kameen, Rethinking Zeal: Is It Zealous Representation or
Zealotry?, 44 APR. MD. B.J. 4, 6 (2011) (“Thus in 1983, the Model Rules moved the
discussion of zealous representation from the body of the Rules to the Preamble.”); see
also Michael H. Rubin, The Ethical Utah Lawyer: What Are the Limits in Negotiation?,
21 APR. UTAH B.J. 15, 15 (2008) (“In fact, ‘zealous advocacy’ has not been a
requirement of national lawyers' codes since 1983 . . . .”).
30

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980).

31

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-39 (1980).

7
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obligation of lawyers to represent their clients zealously
within the framework of the law. 32
In the current version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, this
explicit obligation of zealous advocacy no longer exists. 33 Zealous
advocacy is mentioned only in the Preamble and in the comment to Rule
1.3. 34 The Preamble to the Model Rules provides an overview of the role
of a lawyer. More specifically it provides:
[1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and
a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality
of justice.
[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs
various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client
with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights
and obligations and explains their practical implications.
As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position
under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but
consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others.
As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client's legal
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others. 35
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3 states, “A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” 36 The
32

Id.

33

See Rubin, supra note 29, at 15.

34

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (2006); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT PREAMBLE (2006).
35

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (2006).

36

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2006).

8
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comment to this rule mentions zealous advocacy. It provides as follows:
“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests
of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf. A lawyer
is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized
for a client.” 37
[11] The Model Rules make clear that this discussion of zealous
advocacy in the Preamble and in a comment do not create an ethical
obligation of zealous advocacy. 38 More explicitly, the last paragraph of
the Scope of the Model Rules states: “The Comment accompanying each
Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule. The
Preamble and this note on Scope provide general orientation. The
Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each
Rule is authoritative.” 39
[12] With that knowledge of the history of the no longer existing ethical
obligation of zealous advocacy, the Sedona Conference® provides the
following response in its Guidance for Litigators & In-House Counsel:
Litigators are, of course, expected and ethically required to
be advocates for their clients. They are also expected and
ethically required to conduct discovery in a diligent,
efficient, and candid manner. The tone of a case is usually
set at the beginning, so it is important for all counsel to
abide by and advance the principles of cooperative
discovery at the outset of the case. 40

37

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt (2006).

38

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope (2006).

39

Id.

40

THE SEDONA CONFERENCE® COOPERATION GUIDANCE
COUNSEL, supra note 27, at 2.

9
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[13] The Guidance identifies opportunities for constructive, mutually
beneficial cooperation with opposing counsel, and provides pointers on
how to take advantage of such opportunities. 41
[14] Following the creation of the Cooperation Proclamation, many
courts have now written opinions urging counsel to be cooperative. 42 For
example, Judge Paul Grimm, in Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services
Company, wrote:
Although judges, scholars, commentators and lawyers
themselves long have recognized the problems associated
with abusive discovery, what has been missing is a
thoughtful means to engage all the stakeholders in the
litigation process—lawyers, judges and the public at
large—and provide them with the encouragement, means
and incentive to approach discovery in a different way.
The Sedona Conference, a non-profit, educational research
institute best known for its Best Practices
Recommendations and Principles for Addressing
Electronic Document Production, recently issued a
Cooperation Proclamation to announce the launching of “a
national drive to promote open and forthright information
sharing, dialogue (internal and external), training, and the
development of practical tools to facilitate cooperative,
collaborative, transparent discovery.” . . . In the meantime,
however, the present dispute evidences the need for clearer
guidance how to comply with the requirements of Rules
26(b)(2)(C) and 26(g) in order to ensure that the Plaintiffs
obtain appropriate discovery to support their claims, and
the Defendants are not unduly burdened by discovery
41

See id. at 3.

42

See, e.g., Gipson v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., No. 08-2017-EFM-DJW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
103822 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 2008); Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D.
354 (D. Md. 2008).

10
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demands that are disproportionate to the issues in this
case. 43
In one of my opinions, Gipson v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, I
stated:
As of the date of the discovery conference, more than 115
motions and 462 docket entries had been filed in this case,
even though the case has been on file for less than a year.
Many of the motions filed have addressed matters that the
Court would have expected the parties to be able to resolve
without judicial involvement.
This Court’s goal, in accordance with Rule 1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, is to administer the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in a “just, speedy and inexpensive”
manner. To assist the Court in accomplishing this goal, the
parties are encouraged to resolve discovery and other
pretrial issues without the Court's involvement. To help the
parties and counsel understand their discovery obligations,
counsel are directed to read the Sedona Conference
Cooperation Proclamation, which this Court has previously
endorsed. 44
[15] There are now numerous opinions making the same point about
cooperation, yet it appears that cooperation is not being used enough as a
method of obtaining the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of”

43

Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 363 (footnote call numbers omitted) (quoting The Sedona
Conference®, The Sedona Conference® Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 21, at
331) (citing THE SEDONA CONFERENCE®, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
PRODUCTION (2004), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/m
iscFiles/SedonaPrinciples 200401.pdf).
44

Gipson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103822, at *4 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).

11
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the action. 45 Why is cooperation not happening often enough and what
can be done to increase cooperation in litigation?
[16] There are numerous reasons why cooperation is often not
happening. One is the misconception I have already discussed—that
lawyers have an ethical obligation of zealous advocacy in every aspect of
litigation. Another reason is that lawyers who become litigators often
have personalities that love conflict and competition. They do not enjoy
cooperation as much as they enjoy conflict. Some lawyers may also be
operating under the impression that their clients are impressed by shows of
aggression. In addition, combative pretrial behavior may be an attempt to
avoid or postpone something that some lawyers fear, and that is an actual
trial on the merits.
[17] Another reason that is not openly discussed often is that the hourly
billing system used by many law firms is an incentive to engage in conflict
instead of cooperation. 46 It takes more time to fight over everything than
it takes to cooperate. Thus, when the lawyer is paid based solely on how
much time they spend working, there is a disincentive to cooperate and
therefore a potential conflict with the client’s interest in resolving the
litigation in a cost effective manner.
[18] So, what can the courts and the profession do to increase
cooperation in litigation? Judges and lawyers have to take the position
that the goal of litigation is the “just, speedy and inexpensive
determination” of the matter as Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure already makes clear. 47

45

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

46

See David J. Waxse, Ethical Implications of Hourly Billing, 67 DEC. J. KAN. B. ASS’N
2, 2 (1998).

47

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue 3

[19] To reach that goal, lawyers need to follow, and judges need to
require compliance with, several other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
that imply cooperation but are not used enough to promote cooperation.
For example, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 provides that the Court may enter orders
for the following purposes:
Rule 16. Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management
(a) Purposes of a Pretrial Conference. In any action, the
court may order the attorneys and any unrepresented parties
to appear for one or more pretrial conferences for such
purposes as:
(1) expediting disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that
the case will not be protracted because of lack of
management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more
thorough preparation; and
(5) facilitating settlement. 48
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) requires that the court limit discovery in
certain instances. 49 Cooperative lawyers would do this on their own. For
those who are not cooperating, this rule provides the following:
When Required. On motion or on its own, the court must
limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise
allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative
or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive;

48

FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (emphasis added).

49

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

13
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(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample
opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the
action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties'
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues. 50
[20] Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) is another rule that promotes cooperation by
setting out the parties’ planning conference duties. 51 Parties must consider
“the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for
promptly settling or resolving the case; make or arrange for the disclosures
required by Rule 26(a)(1); discuss any issues about preserving
discoverable information; and develop a proposed discovery plan.” 52 The
Rule also establishes that “[t]he attorneys of record and all unrepresented
parties that have appeared in the case are jointly responsible for arranging
the conference, for attempting in good faith to agree on the proposed
discovery plan, and for submitting to the court . . . a written report
outlining the plan.” 53
[21] Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g) allows the court to insure that lawyers are not
being uncooperative by making improper discovery requests and
responses. 54 The Rule provides:
50

Id.

51

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).

52

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2).

53

Id.

54

See, e.g., Mezu v. Morgan St. Univ., 269 F.R.D. 565, 585—86 (D. Md. 2010) (ordering
counsel to submit written verification that they carefully read Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26, stating that “the ‘spirit and purposes’ of these discovery rules requires
cooperation by counsel to identify and fulfill legitimate discovery needs, yet avoid

14
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(1) Signature Required; Effect of Signature. Every
disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1) or (a)(3) and every
discovery request, response, or objection must be signed by
at least one attorney of record in the attorney's own name . .
. . By signing, an attorney or party certifies that to the best
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed
after a reasonable inquiry:
(A) with respect to a disclosure, it is complete and
correct as of the time it is made; and
(B) with respect to a discovery request, response, or
objection, it is:
(i) consistent with these rules and warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or
for establishing new law;
(ii) not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and
(iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly
burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of
the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in
controversy, and the importance of the issues at
stake in the action. 55
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3) provides courts with an enforcement tool. 56 It
states:

seeking discovery the cost and burden of which is disproportionally large to what is at
stake” (quoting Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 357-58 (D.
Md. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
55

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1).

56

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3); Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 357 (discussing the court’s ability
to impose “an appropriate sanction” for a discovery violation).

15
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If a certification violates this rule without substantial
justification, the court, on motion or on its own, must
impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the party on
whose behalf the signer was acting, or both. The sanction
may include an order to pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, caused by the violation. 57
[22] In addition to the Rules of Civil Procedure, Congress arms courts
with a statutory provision designed to enforce cooperation. 58 28 U.S.C. §
1927 states:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in
any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who
so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct. 59
[23] Provided that counsel actually use and understand the Rules and
the enforcement statute, they provide a clear path to cooperation. 60 They
also provide judges with sufficient tools to insure that counsel are focused
on the goals enumerated in Rule of Civil Procedure 1, and that they use

57

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3).

58

See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006); Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to
“Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions
Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1073-74 (1994) (noting that through § 1927, courts
may impose such sanctions “[u]nder their inherent judicial power”).
59

28 U.S.C. § 1927.

60

See Mezu v. Morgan St. Univ., 269 F.R.D. 565, 585-86 (D. Md. 2010) (lamenting
counsel’s “deficient knowledge of fundamental rules of procedure, local rules, discovery
guidelines, and decisional authority which, collectively unambiguously establish the
Court’s expectation about how discovery is to be conducted to achieve the aspirations of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1”).

16
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cooperation to reach those goals. 61 If counsel understand that courts
expect their cooperation, it is more likely to occur. This is also another
consensus from the Duke Conference. 62 Lawyers are more cooperative
when they know that the judge is watching (providing “adult supervision”)
and enforcing cooperation responsibilities. 63
[24] Finally, it may be helpful for a few lawyers to remind them that
cooperation is something they should have learned in school. Some, who
cannot seem to learn to cooperate, might benefit from this list for
elementary school teachers, explaining how to be a cooperative person:
LISTEN carefully to others and be sure you understand
what they are saying.
SHARE when you have something that others would like to
have.
TAKE TURNS when there is something that nobody wants
to do, or when more than one person wants to do the same
thing.
COMPROMISE when you have a serious conflict.
DO YOUR PART the very best that you possibly can. This
will inspire others to do the same.
SHOW APPRECIATION to people for what they
contribute.
ENCOURAGE PEOPLE to do their best.

61

See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also id.

62

See Mary Mack, Duke Conference on Civil Procedure and eDiscovery- Day 2,
(May 11, 2010), http://www.discoveryresources.org/library/caselaw-and-rules/duke-conference-on-civil-procedure-and-ediscovery-day-2/ (stating that
there was a consensus at the conference that it was necessary to educate the bar on
procedural e-discovery issues and expectations).
DISCOVERY RESOURCES

63

See Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE
L.J. 669, 734-37 (2010) (noting the inevitable “struggle to control costs if lawyers
continue to act like spoiled children”).
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MAKE PEOPLE FEEL NEEDED. Working together is a
lot more fun that way.
DON'T ISOLATE OR EXCLUDE ANYONE. Everybody
has something valuable to offer, and nobody likes being left
out. 64
It is never too late to learn how to be cooperativeeven for litigators in
federal court. Both judges and lawyers must stay focused on securing “the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding,” 65 and cooperation is the best way to reach that goal.

64

How to Be a Cooperative Person, Teaching Guide: COOPERATION for Grades K-5,
http://www.goodcharacter.com/YCC/Cooperation.html (last
visited Feb. 6, 2012).

GOODCHARACTER.COM,

65

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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